RELIGIOUS PLURALISM: A DEFENSE OF EXCLUSIVISM IN CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the time of globalization and post-post modern world or new Era, such things are rapidly changing. For instance, Language, communication system, education system, society, culture, environment, economy, politics, marketing system, and even one’s belief perspectives etc. The credit goes to the media and internet technology which have boosted the globally developing concept and which is very much appreciable. Therefore, if we see the first side of this quick growth is good and must be welcome and embrace with open arms. Because it puts new insight in each areas mentioned above. On the other hand, this rapid growth or new ideology is jeopardy from metaphysical perspective, because it interferes with one’s belief systems as supernatural and devalues the concept of “The Only.” Officially, this ideology considered as “Religious Pluralism.” Around the world, there are many groups of people, who have embraced the religious pluralism. The chief expounder of this view is John Hick of Claremont Graduate School in California, who first propounded it in his book God and the Universe of Faiths (1973).

1.1 Definition

Pluralism is basically the belief that the world religions are true and equally valid in their communication of the truth about God, the world, and salvation.[1]

For the expansion of the view, many Scholars do review or redefine the religious pluralism positively. For instance,

·         "...pluralism is not the sheer fact of this plurality alone, but is active engagement with plurality. Pluralism and plurality are sometimes used as if they were synonymous. But plurality is just diversity, plain and simple -- splendid, colorful, maybe even threatening. Such diversity does not, however, have to affect me. I can observe diversity. I can even celebrate diversity, as the clich? goes. But I have to participate in pluralism....Pluralism requires the cultivation of public space where we all encounter one another."[2]

·         Pluralism...holds to one's own faith, and at the same time, engages other faiths in learning about their path and how they want to be understood.... Pluralism and dialogue are the means for building bridges and relationships that create harmony and peace on our planet home.[3]

·         Fundamental to the philosophical acceptance of pluralism is the conviction that we have no self-evident, incorrigible means of establishing the truth of our assertions. This is not to say that we have no means available; however, the means at our disposal will not necessarily convince those with whom we disagree. Consequently, we must hold open the possibility that those who disagree with us do so rationally. This position implies neither relativism nor indifferentism to truth. It simply suggests that we cannot coerce others into believing as we do. We can offer our reasons for so believing, but these reasons, even if sufficient to support our claims, will not compel others to accept our beliefs.[4]

·         Religions teach multiple truths --- all valid: "The theory that there are more than one…[kind]...of ultimate reality and/or truth - and that therefore more than one religion can be said to have the truth (way to God, salvation, etcetera)."[5] Anton Hein

·         "Pluralism is an affirmation of the validity of every religion, and the refusal to choose between them, and the rejection of world evangelism...."[6] John Stott, Anglican theologian.

For the religious pluralism, there are much more definitions which we can mention here, but due to the words and time limitation I will be limiting my writing with a response only on Hick’s Hypothesis. Therefore, in this course paper entitled “Religious Pluralism: A Defense of Exclusivism in Christian Perspective” my position will be exclusive in Christian perspective followed by two premises:

(1) the world was created by God, an almighty, all-knowing and perfectly good personal being (one that holds beliefs, has aims, plans and intentions, and can act to accomplish these aims) and

(2) Human beings require salvation, and God has provided a unique way of salvation through the incarnation, life, sacrificial death and resurrection of his divine son.

Consider these two premises as my hypothesis for exclusivism. Both hypotheses weather Hick’s hypothesis or mine, must not be consider valid or invalid unless they pass such primary tests. For instance, are they reasonable? Are they logically coherent? Are they historically reliable? Are they having empirical application? Then we may rely on better one.

Here is the theory of religious pluralism in brief before we see Hick’s model: A theory of religious pluralism says that all religions of some kind are the same in some valuable respect(s). While this is compatible with some religion being the best in some other respect(s), the theorists using this label have in mind that many religions are equal regarding the central value(s) of religion.

Further, this theory states that all religions lead to the same God and all ways lead to heaven. According to Hick, Christianity is not the one and only way of salvation, but one among several. To a pluralist such as Hick, Christianity is not the absolute, unique, and final way to God. While pluralists assert the validity of all religions, they also deny the finality of all religions. According to Hick, in the evolutionary scheme of things in which at isolated ages and places the early religions are succeeded by higher religions, it is the same message of God that comes distinctly to a particular group but in a different form from the others. Hick challenges the older view that Christ or Christianity must be seen at the center of religions. Rather, he says, God must be seen at the center of religions. The pluralistic contention is that although religions have different outward forms, all have the same source.[7]

 CHAPTER 2

HICK’S MODEL FOR RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

It was six men of Indostan to learning much inclined,

Who went to see the Elephant (though all of them were blind),

That each by observation might satisfy his mind

The First approached the Elephant, and happening to fall

Against his broad and sturdy side, at once began to bawl:

“God bless me! But the Elephant is very like a wall!”

The second, feeling of the tusk, cried, “Ho! what have we here

So very round and smooth and sharp? To me ’tis mighty clear

This wonder of an Elephant is very like a spear!”

The Third approached the animal, and happening to take

The squirming trunk within his hands, Thus boldly up and spake:

“I see,” quoth he, “the Elephant is very like a snake!”

The Fourth reached out an eager hand, and felt about the knee.

“What most this wondrous beast is like is mighty plain,” quoth he;

“’Tis clear enough the Elephant is very like a tree!”

The Fifth, who chanced to touch the ear, said: “E’en the blindest man

Can tell what this resembles most; deny the fact who can

This marvel of an elephant is very like a fan!”

The Sixth no sooner had begun about the beast to grope,

Than, seizing on the swinging tail that fell within his scope,

“I see,” quoth he, “the Elephant is very like a rope!”

And so these men of Indostan disputed loud and long,

Each in his own opinion exceeding stiff and strong,

Though each was partly in the right, and all were in the wrong![8]

This poem, written to illustrate what happens when six blind men try to describe the elephant that none of them have seen, has been used to describe religious pluralism. John Hick sets forth an explanation of religious pluralism in which he defends the claim that all religions have different ways of describing the same reality. Hick writes,

Stated philosophically such a pluralism [i.e., religious pluralism] is the view that the great world faiths embody different perceptions and conceptions of the Real or the Ultimate from within the major variant cultural ways of being human; and that within each of them the transformation of human existence from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness is manifestly taking place – and taking place, so far as human observation can tell, to much the same extent. Thus the great religious traditions are to be regarded as alternative soteriological “spaces” within which, or “ways” along which, men and woman can find salvation/liberation/ enlightenment/fulfillment.[9]

Thus, Hick’s description of religious pluralism does more than recognize that there is religious diversity. His view emphasizes that essentially all the religions are simply different expressions or explanations of the same divine reality. Yet, how can Hick hold that his view is true given the admitted differences in the explanation of both reality and what is divine? Hick gives several reasons for holding his belief in religious pluralism. These reasons constitute what he calls the ground plan to hold a theory of religious pluralism. The basis for needing this theory is to reconcile the differences between the religions and focus on the similarities. First is the claim that all the great religious traditions hold a similar view in what they describe as the ultimate Reality. He writes, 

Each of the great religious traditions affirms that in addition to the social and natural world of our ordinary human experience there is a  3 limitlessly greater and higher Reality beyond or within us, in relation to which or to whom is our highest good. The ultimately real and the ultimately valuable are one, and to give oneself freely and totally to this One is our final salvation/liberation/enlightenment/fulfillment.[10]

Hick sees this characteristic that all religions share – namely, the belief in a higher reality – as significant. Coupled with this belief is that only by having a relation to the higher reality will we reach our highest good. Third, the only way to have a relation to the higher reality is to give oneself freely and totally to it.

Hick also wants people to accept a distinction that has been handed to him by Immanuel Kant. As Kant famously said, there is a difference between something as it appears to you and as it is in itself, so too one needs to understand there is a distinction between the Real as it is in itself and the Real as we experience it.

For example, when a police officer questions many people who were witnesses to an accident, he writes many different reports about the same event. In the same way, people may experience and describe the same Reality in different ways.  Further, the culture of each person affects the way they look at the Absolute. Hick explains, “But human projection does not – on this view – bring God into existence; rather it affects the ways in which the independently existing divine Reality is experienced.” The reason for the variety of religions is basically the Real as it is in itself can be experienced in many ways and described differently. For Hick this is the heart of his hypothesis.

In other words, a human projects certain anthropomorphic features onto the description of God. This happens because of the culture the person was born into as well as the different ways the person has been given to interpret an experience with the Absolute. This explains why each tradition calls God a different name. In one tradition God is the Father, another calls God Allah, and yet another calls God Shiva.[11]

This explanation is used to say how each of the world religions has a different, but equally valid view of the same Reality

These many different perceptions of the Real, both theistic and nontheistic, can only establish themselves as authentic by their soteriological efficacy. The great world traditions have in fact all proved to be realms within which or routes along which people are enabled to advance in the transition from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness. And, since they reveal the Real in such different lights, we must conclude that they are independently valid.[12]

Therefore, according to Hick theistic and non-theistic religions are only different conceptions of the same reality, having both authenticity and validity because they move people from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness.

CHAPTER 3

LOGICAL INCOHERENCY IN HICK’S MODEL

When dealing with the questions about truth claims, it is important to distinguish between different types of truth claims.  What is most useful in this discussion is to evaluate whether these are subjective or objective. Truth claims that are purely subjective are claims about matters of taste. It may be true that I prefer chocolate ice cream to vanilla (which is subjective). I, as the subject of the claim, am the only one who has direct access to whether what I say is true (though you may have knowledge of this for various reasons if what you’ve inferred corresponds to reality). Objective truth claims are claims that are accessible to people other than only the subject. An example of an objective truth claim is George Bush was the President of the United States in 2005. Consider also that the claim that George Bush was President of the United States in 2005, if it is true, is true transculturally. This means that in every culture and for every person it is true that George Bush was President of the United States in 2005. One needs to ask whether  the world religions claim to be objectively or subjectively true. If they claim to be objectively true, then their truth claims may be examined and found to be true or false. Additionally, one must realize the difference between the truth of a claim and the process of testing the truth of a claim. Thus, there may be a number of ways to test the truth of a claim. For example, if a claim is logically coherent, it may be true. Logical coherence can thus be a good test for truth. However, a test for truth is different from the actual truth of the claim. For example, Shakespeare’s work on Julius Caesar may be logically coherent and still not be true.  Nonetheless, if a claim is true, then statements that are the opposite of the claim are false.

 Something that one may note from Hick’s argument is that he says all the different religious views are valid. Consider the unique way Hick is using the term valid here. If Hick is using the term valid in the logical sense, then he is simply referring to the form of the claim.  For example, logicians consider the following syllogism to be valid:

P1) All insects have eight legs. 

P2) A spider is an insect.

Therefore, all spiders have eight legs.

 So, although the argument is valid, the premises are not true. However, what is not so important is whether the religious view is valid, but whether the view is true. Similarly, when the world religions make claims about reality, what is important is whether the claims that are made correspond to reality.

The goal of an argument is to make sure it is sound. For an argument to be sound, it must have a valid form with true premises. When the argument is both valid and the premises are true then the conclusion necessarily follows and we call it sound. Thus, if Hick is strictly limiting his meaning to validity as a logician does, his claim that all religious descriptions are valid is not enough to tell us whether they are true.

Further, all people, including Hick, must recognize the first principles of knowledge, specifically the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle. These first principles are self-evident once one understands the terms. The law of non-contradiction says, “A is not non-A.” One way to illustrate this truth is to plug something in for the variable A. Thus, one can say, “Existence is not non-Existence.” One can also apply this principle to truth claims. For example, if the claim George Bush was President of the United States in 2005 is true, then the claim that George Bush was not President of the United States in 2005 is false.  Another first principle is the law of excluded middle. This principle says, “either A or non-A.” In an example similar to the principle of non-contradiction, something either exists or it does not exist, and there is no middle ground. Applying this example to another truth claim one can say, “Either George Bush was President of the United States in 2005 or he was not.”

3.1 Critiques on Hick’s Model

3.1.1 Critique 1

One criticism of Hick is that different religions have contradictory truth claims about reality. Hick admits that some say that God is personal and others say that God is non-personal. Now either God is personal or not. It cannot be true that God is both personal and non-personal given the law of excluded middle. Applying the law of non-contradiction, if God is personal, then God is not non-personal. Thus, Hick cannot say that these contradictory truth claims about the nature of God are both true without violating a first principle.

Take the law of non-contradiction and apply it to the example of the officer taking several different reports on an accident. Suppose one person says that a car ran over only one graduate student in the philosophy department, and another says that a car ran over several students. One may ask whether both reports are describing the same event. If one discovers they are about the same event, at least one of the accounts is false (as they both can’t be true, but both can be false if nobody is actually run over).  Also, if one report is true, the other is necessarily false. Similarly, in view of radically different descriptions of reality, if one is true, then the other is false.

3.1.2 Critique 2

The second criticism of Hick’s position is that his account reinterprets a religious belief when it cannot account for contradiction. For example, when discussing what the goal of all religions is, he says that the goal is to move people from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness in order to relate to the Absolute. Further, this goal is reached by giving oneself freely and totally to this One as our final salvation or liberation or enlightenment. Why does Hick equate salvation with liberation and enlightenment? Hick must blur the distinction between certain terms to equate them to such an extent that they are rendered completely different than what they mean to each of the world religions that use them. Thus, Christians believe that salvation describes the fact that they are saved from at least some of the consequences of sin. Yet, liberation often is used to mean that one is freed from thinking there is any such thing as sin. Enlightenment often has different meanings as well and can be used to describe coming to a realization that desire is the primary obstacle to finding a release from suffering.  As is seen in these examples, changing the meaning of a word from the way it is used in its own religious system commits the fallacy of equivocation. Salvation does not mean liberation or enlightenment. The consequence of this criticism of Hick’s equivocal account of different religious views is made clear in two ways. First, if Hick’s description uses the word salvation equivocally to mean enlightenment, then by not using the word as Christians use it he has not really told us how the Christian term salvation is like the eastern teaching of enlightenment. Second, Hick has not really shown how all religions teach the same thing because he has not accurately represented all religions. As a matter of fact, he ignores essential distinctions that different religions make, and does not even address all religions due to his equivocation of certain religious terms. Thus, Hick fails in the task he set out to demonstrate (that all religions describe the same reality) given the fact he does not even address all religions. At most he has shown that there are some superficial similarities between some religions. 

3.1.3 Critique 3

A third criticism is that Hick overlooks the most important difference that various religions make what are the means to reach the end? Thus, when two religions claim one can have a relationship with God in different ways, Hick focuses instead on the ends that both share instead of the means by which to reach the end. Thus, one may grant that Hick is correct that the essence of all world religions teaches one about how to have a relationship with God. Suppose that the thing in common among the various religions is the end they all want to reach.  Even with this supposition, that which is different is the means the different religions explain by which one can reach the end. One religion claims that it is only by doing enough good works that one will be reconciled to God. Another claims that one can never be reconciled to God by doing good works. One is either reconciled to God by doing good works or not. If one is reconciled to God by works, then the one that claims the opposite is wrong and vice versa. These are contradictory means given by different religions to reach God.

3.1.4 Critique 4

The fourth criticism is that Hick’s analysis presupposes that he has access to the Reality everyone else only partially describes. Hick actually admits his description of religious pluralism is like the one of the elephant and the six blind men. However, he also says that he does not claim to know his description with infallible cognition. But, Hick does not see this as a weakness of his position. The reason is that other religions have no infallible cognition either.  The problem that becomes obvious does not relate to whether Hick has infallible cognition, but that he views a reality that all the other world religions miss. Further, by the very nature of his analysis, Hick claims to be in the position that he can view reality as it really is in order to critique all the other religions. Thus, despite his denial, his description puts him in the place that he has the “point of view of someone who can observe both elephant and blind men.” Of course, the problem with this is twofold. First, how did Hick get this transcendent view that all others do not have? He admits that his hypothesis is arrived at inductively. Yet, I can see no good reason to believe that his hypothesis is true given the nature of competing and contradictory truth claims. Second, it seems like the account of the blind men and the elephant actually points to the fact that all the blind men are wrong about reality. This is obvious because the elephant is not like a rope, spear, snake, or any of the others. The entire parable rests on a fundamental mistake that the men make because they are blind. However, the one describing the picture of the elephant and blind men who has sight can clearly see what the elephant is.    

CHAPTER 4

MARBANIANG, EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM WITH HICK’S MODEL

 Dr. Domenic Marbaniang in his e-book Hermeneutics of Religion, briefly and effectively mentioned the epistemological problem with Hick’s model of religious pluralism. In short, we will look at the epistemological problem with Hick’s model presented by Dr. Marbaniang: 

Hick’s arguments for diverse, and often contradictory, religious responses to “Ultimate Reality” have been the subject of almost every discussion in the theology of religions. His own Copernican Revolution model based on Kant’s Copernican Revolution model has been variously analyzed by leading philosophers of the day. One of the best critiques made was by George I Mavrodes in John Hick’s Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion (2001).[13] A paraphrasal gist of the whole argument can be summed up as follows (with additional comments):

1.      Is the noumena of Hick plural or singular? In other words, is Hick a polytheist or monotheist? Hick calls the noumena as ineffable? However, he seems to be preferring the singular over the plural, though he admits that even the concept of the “one” (number) is phenomenal and so can’t be applied to the noumena.

2.      How can a neither-not, unrelated, amoral, ineffable, and unconcerned noumena account for religious ideals such as love, goodness, kindness, and care?

3.      If the phenomenal is the final product of the human mind, in all its diversity, then how does that rule out the possibility that that mind was created by the noumenalin order to know both the phenomenal and the noumenal?

4.      There is a possibility that a non-Hickian philosopher who doesn’t believe that a connection exists between the Real and religious phenomena would postulate something else to account for such phenomena. He would postulate the Unreal, and it would look as much ineffable and attribute-less like Hick’s Real.

Hick responds by admitting the inadequacy of language and the misleading potentiality of talking about the Real in plural terms. That, of course, doesn’t seem to solve the problem of genuine moral experience and the many contradictorily diverse interpretations of “God”.

While one can be sympathetic with Hick’s quest for unity in diversity, for peace and harmony, one must be careful with his interpretation of a theory that he avouches as his starting point towards this end. Kant’s phenomenalism would never say that the same reality (noumenon) would appear (phenomenon) to be one to few and many to others (for instance, if I see a cup of coffee on my desk, I would assume that it wouldn’t appear as two cups of coffee to a number of others; at least, I would assume that even though it did appear to be two due to some particular eye-malady, the subjects would soon discover the error of their vision when they extend their hand to drink from the cup). There is certain absoluteness to even phenomenal truth, since the a priori categories of Kant’s pure reason involve necessity and universality in application. There can be plurality of things but not plurality of truths, and religious truth can’t admit an excuse, given even the noumena/phenomena distinction. Hick’s interpretation would certainly be disapproved by Kant.

Now, Hick employs another model to explain the diversity. He calls it “experience-as”, which is his adaptation of Wittgenstein’s “seeing-as” which may be summed up in the epigram “You see it as you interpret it”. For instance, in the following duck/rabbit picture by Jastrow, one can either see a duck or a rabbit in it.

The postulate would be that Reality is ambiguous, and therefore open to contradictory interpretations. That might, perhaps, solve the problem of religious diversity to an extent. However, it would also demolish all absolute claims to genuine religious experience. One can’t just hold on to his own interpretation of the Real as true; but, must admit other interpretations as equally valid. This becomes normative in a way. One would ask, “Can the Real be experienced as Good by some and Evil by others?” Hick has indicated in his dialogue with Alister McGrath in Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World(by Okholm& Phillips, 1995) that his theory is mainly concerned with “the great world religions”, and so references to Satanism, Rastafarianism, and such could be immediately taken out. It certainly seems evident that Hick’s concept of objective ambiguity is governed by the criteria of objective morality. Thus, Kant’s influence has a thorough effect (cf. The Critique of Practical Reason). Whatever the noumenal is in itself, the phenomenal cannot be immoral, though “it” be amorally construed.[14]

Unity and morality are his guiding lights. A Christian will know where these lights, if rightly followed, would lead.

CHAPTER 5

SCHOLARLY VIEWS ON HICK’S MODEL

5.1 Alister McGrath

In its most extreme form, this view results in the claim that all, religions lead to God. But this cannot be taken seriously, when some world religions are avowedly non­ theistic. A religion can hardly lead to God if it explicitly denies the existence of a god or any gods. We therefore need to restate the question in terms of ‘ultimate reality’, or ‘truth’. Thus refined, this position might be, stated as follows. Religion is often determined by the circumstances of one’s birth. An Indian is likely to be a Hindu; an Arab is likely to be a Moslem. On account of this observation, it is argued, all religions must be equal paths to the truth.This makes truth a function of birth. If I were to be born into Nazi Germany, I would be likely to be a Nazi – and this makes Nazism true? If I had been born in ancient Rome, I would probably have shared its polytheism; if I had been born in modern Arabia, I would be a monotheist. So they are both true? No other intellectual discipline would accept such a superficial approach to truth. Why accept it here? It seems to rest upon an entirely laudable wish to allow that everyone is right, which ends up destroying the notion of truth itself. Consider the two propositions:

a. Different people have different religious views.

b. Therefore all religious views are equally valid.

Is proposition (b) in any way implied by proposition (a)? For the form of liberalism committed to this approach, mere existence of a religious idea appears to be a guarantor of its truth! Yet no one seems prepared to fight for the truth content of defunct religions, such as classical polytheism – perhaps because there is, no one alive committed to them, whose views need to be respected in a multicultural situation? The fatal weakness of this approach usually leads to its being abandoned, being replaced with a modified version, which could be stated thus: ‘Any view which is held with sincerity may be is regarded as true’. I might thus be a Nazi, a Satanist, or a passionate believer in the flatness of the earth. My sincerity is a guarantee of the truth. On this view, it would follow that if someone sincerely believes that modern Europe would be a better place if six million Jews were to be placed in gas chambers, the sincerity of those convictions allow that view to be accepted as true. British philosopher of religion John Hick summarizes the absurdity of this view, ‘To say that whatever is sincerely believed, and practised is, by definition, true, would be the end of all critical discrimination, both intellectual and moral. On the basis of Hick's homogenizing approach, no genuine conflicting truth claims can occur. They are ruled out of order, on a priori grounds: by definition, religions can only complement, not contradict, each other. In practice, Hick appears to contradict himself here, frequently declaring that ‘exclusive’ approaches to religions are wrong. For example, he styles the traditional ‘salvation through Christ alone’ statements of the 1960 Congress on World Mission as ‘ridiculous – where, by his own criteria, the most stinging criticism that could be directed at them is that they represent a ‘difference in perception. The inherent absurdity of Hick's refusal to take an evaluative position in relation to other religions is compromised by his eagerness to adopt such a position in relation to versions of Christianity which threaten his outlook, both on account of their numerical strength and non inclusive theologies. When all is said and done, and when all differences in expression arising from cultural and intellectual development are taken into account, Hick must be challenged forcefully concerning his crudely homogenizing approach to the world religions. It is absurd to say that a religion which says that there is a God complements a religion which declares, with equal vigour, that there is not a God (and both types of religion exist). the religious believer actually believes something, then disagreement is inevitable – and proper. As the distinguished American philosopher Richard Rorty remarked, nobody ‘except the occasional cooperative freshman’ really believes that ‘two incompatible opinions on an important topic are equally good.’ Hick has predetermined that there shall not be differences among the religions; and there the matter rests – for him. Where contradiction arises, we are confronted with cases of special pleading, or death by a thousand qualifications, as Hick argues by introducing increasingly implausible subsidiary hypotheses which so qualify his original views as to render them virtually devoid of meaning. Having dogmatically determined that all religions possess the same core structure, Hick ruthlessly forces them into the same mould – a mould which owes nothing to the outlooks of the world's religions, and everything to the liberal cultural agenda which so obviously inspires Hick's theories.

One of the most serious difficulties which arises here relates to the fact that, on the basis of Hick's model, it is not individual religions which have access to truth; it is the western liberal pluralist, who insists that each religion must be seen in the context of others, before it can be evaluated. As many have pointed out this means that the western liberal doctrine of religious pluralism is defined as the only valid standpoint for evaluating individual religions. Hick has set at the centre of his system of religions vague and undefined idea of ‘the Eternal One’, which seems to be a little more than a vague liberal idea of divinity, carefully defined or, more accurately, deliberately not defined, to avoid the damage that precision entails – to include at least something from all of the major world religions Hick feels it is worth including.

To develop this important point, let us consider a well-worn analogy concerning the relation of the religions. Let us allow Lesslie Newbigin to describe it, and make a vitally important, observation:

In the famous story of the blind men and the elephant...the real point of the story is constantly overlooked. The story is told from the point of view of the king and his courtiers, who are not blind but can see that the blind men are unable to grasp the full reality of the elephant and are only able to get hold of part of it. The story is constantly told in order to neutralize the affirmations of the great religions, to suggest that they learn humility and recognize that none of them can have more than one aspect of the truth. But, of course, the real point of the story is exactly the opposite. If the king were also blind, there would be no story. The story is told by the king, and it is the immensely arrogant claim of one who sees the full truth, which all the world’s religions are only groping after. It embodies the claim to know the full reality, which relativizes all the claims of the religions.[15]

Newbigin brings out with clarity the arrogance of the liberal claim to be able to see all the religions from the standpoint of one who sees the full truth. The liberal pluralist is the king; the unfortunate evangelical is the blindfolded beggar. Or so the pluralist would have us believe. Perhaps a more responsible – and considerably less arrogant – approach would be to suggest that we are all, pluralists included, blind beggars, to whom God graciously makes himself known.[16]

To give his case more academic credibility, Hick argues that there is a common core structure to all religions. The various religions represent equally ‘valid’ and ‘real’ experiences and apprehensions of the one divine reality. (Note that the fact that there is only one divine reality is assumed as requiring no proof – but polytheism cannot be dismissed as easily as this.) On the basis of this assumption, he declares that all religions ‘are fundamentally alike in exhibiting a soteriological structure. That is to say, they are all concerned with salvation/liberation/ enlightenment/fulfillment. It may reasonable be observed, however, that these concepts of salvation are conceived in such radically different ways, that only someone who was doggedly determined, as a matter of principle, to treat them as aspects of the same greater whole would have sufficient intellectual flexibility to do so. Do Christianity and Satanism really have the same understandings of salvation? Hick would probably reply that Satanism doesn’t count as a religion, thus neatly illustrating that his theory works for those religions he has preselected on the basis of their ability to fit his pluralist mould.

5.2 C. Stephen Evans

Christian philosopher C. Stephen Evans, in his book Philosophy of Religion,[17] points out two weaknesses of the position that people experience the same reality differently. First, it seems to imply a radical skepticism concerning our knowledge of God ­­ the point being that no one can really know God satisfactorily. Second, it does not account for the exclusive claims made by Jesus Christ (Matt. 7:13; John 14:6; Acts 4:12). Jesus claims to be the way, not a way. Christianity's belief in the Incarnation (God entering the world in the person of Jesus Christ) ­­ a direct and historical revelation ­­ is in an entirely different category than the speculative claims of other religions. Revealed religion is specific and understandable. If its claim to be from God and not man can be supported, then its teachings are authoritative and trustworthy.

Additionally, if a person believes that one religion is exclusively true because of special revelation, then his reason for holding to it is that he believes it is God's way, not his own. For Christians, it is the way of Jesus that saves, not our way. We merely repeat the claim made by Jesus Himself: "I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me" (John 14:6). Accepting and proclaiming God's way is therefore not arrogance, it is genuine humility.

It should also be understood that a commitment to the veracity of Christianity does not imply that every feature of non­Christian religions is false. While salvific truth comes only in Jesus Christ (special revelation), other religions may derive general truths about God via natural revelation (i.e., nature or conscience). In this way, differing religions may, and in fact do, share common agreement on secondary doctrines and beliefs.

5.3 Michael Green

Michael Green, drawing on his considerable experience as an evangelist, and the resources of much recent writing on the relation between Christianity and other religions, perhaps says all that needs to be said:

No faith would enjoy wide currency if it did not contain much that was true. Other faiths therefore constitute a preparation for the gospel, and Christ comes not so much to destroy as to fulfil. The convert will not feel that he has lost his background, but that he has discovered that to which, at its best, it pointed. That is certainly the attitude I have found among friends converted to Christ from Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism. They are profoundly grateful for what they have learned in those cultures, but are thrilled beyond words to have discovered a God who has stooped to their condition in coming as the man of Nazareth, and who has rescued them from guilt and alienation by his cross and resurrection.[18]

CHAPTER 6

BIBLICAL BASE FOR EXCLUSIVISM

"There is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved" (Acts 4.12). So proclaimed the early preachers of the gospel of Christ. Indeed, this conviction permeates the New Testament and helped to spur the Gentile mission. Paul invites his Gentile converts to recall their pre-Christian days: "Remember that you were at that time separated from Christ, alienated from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers to the covenants of promise, having no hope and without God in the world" (Ephesians 2.12). The burden of the opening chapters of Romans is to show that this desolate situation is the general condition of mankind. Though God's eternal power and deity are evident through creation (1.20) and the demands of His moral law implanted on the hearts of all persons (2.15) and although God offers eternal life to all who seek Him in well doing (2.7), the tragic fact of the matter is that in general people suppress the truth in unrighteousness, ignoring the Creator (1.21) and flouting the moral law (1.32). Therefore, "all men, both Jews and Greeks, are under the power of sin, as it is written: 'None is righteous, no, not one; no one understands, no one seeks for God...'" (3.9­1 1). Sin is the great leveler, rendering all needy of God's forgiveness and salvation. Given the universality of sin, all persons stand morally guilty and condemned before God, utterly incapable of redeeming themselves through righteous acts (3.19­20). But God in His grace has provided a means of salvation from this state of condemnation: Jesus Christ, by his expiatory death, redeems us from sin and justifies us before God (3.21­26). It is through him and through him alone, then, that God's forgiveness is available (5.12­21). To reject Jesus Christ is therefore to reject God's grace and forgiveness, to refuse the one means of salvation which God has provided. It is to remain under His condemnation and wrath, to forfeit eternally salvation. For someday God will judge all men, "inflicting vengeance upon those who do not know God and upon those who do not obey the gospel of our Lord Jesus. They shall suffer the punishment of eternal destruction and exclusion from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his might" (II Thessalonians 1.8­9).

It was not just Paul who held to this exclusivistic, Christocentric view of salvation. No less than Paul, the apostle John saw no salvation outside of Christ. In his gospel, Jesus declares, "I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father, but by me" (John 14.6). John explains that men love the darkness of sin rather than light, but that God has sent His Son into the world to save the world and to give eternal life to everyone who believes in the Son. "He who believes is not condemned; he who does not believe is condemned already, because he has not believed in the name of the only Son of God" (John 3.18). People are already spiritually dead; but those who believe in Christ pass from death to life (John 5.24). In his epistles, John asserts that no one who denies the Son has the Father and identifies such a person as the antichrist (I John 2.22­23; 4.3; II John 9). In short, "He who has the Son has life; he who has not the Son of God has not life" (I John 5.12). In John's Apocalypse, it is the Lamb alone in heaven and on earth and under the earth who is worthy to open the scroll and its seven seals, for it was he that by his blood ransomed men for God from every tribe and tongue and people and nation on the earth (Revelation 5.1­14). In the consummation, everyone whose name is not found written in the Lamb's book of life is cast into the everlasting fire reserved for the devil and his cohorts (Revelation 20.15).

One could make the same point from the catholic epistles and the pastorals. It is the conviction of the writers of the New Testament that "there is one God, and there is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all" (I Timothy 2.5­6).

Indeed, it is plausible that such was the attitude of Jesus himself. New Testament scholarship has reached something of a consensus that the historical Jesus came on the scene with an unparalleled sense of divine authority, the authority to stand and speak in the place of God Himself and to call men to repentance and faith.[19] Moreover, the object of that faith was he himself, the absolute revelation of God: "All things have been delivered to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him" (Matthew 11.27).[20] On the day of judgment, people's destiny will be determined by how they responded to him: "And I tell you, everyone who acknowledges me before men, the Son of Man also will acknowledge before the angels of God; but he who denies me before men will be denied before the angels of God" (Luke 12.8­9).[21] Frequent warnings concerning hell are found on Jesus' lips, and it may well be that he believed that most of mankind would be damned, while a minority of mankind would be saved: "Enter by the narrow gate, for the gate is wide and the way is easy, that leads to destruction, and those who enter by it are many. For the gate is narrow and the way is hard, that leads to life, and those who find it are few" (Matthew 7:13­14).

A hard teaching, no doubt; but the logic of the New Testament is simple and compelling: The universality of sin and the uniqueness Christ's expiatory sacrifice entail that there is no salvation apart from Christ. Although this exclusivity was scandalous in the polytheistic world of the first century, with the triumph of Christianity throughout the Empire the scandal receded. Indeed, one of the classic marks of the church was its catholicity, and for men like Augustine and Aquinas the universality of the church was one of the signs that the Scriptures are divine revelation, since so great a structure could not have been generated by and founded upon a falsehood.[22]

  

CONCLUSION

The view that all religions dead to ultimate or true reality logically, epistemologically, empirically, ethically, and socially is invalid where as Biblical exclusivism has-been evaluated in the ways and it seems logically more appropriate to pursue it. Therefore, people who argue that all religions are equally valid (i.e., metaphysically true) either know little about the various religions or have given up reasoning in a logical fashion. A cursory study of the world religions reveals the fundamental and irreconcilable differences that exist. For example, some religions affirm monotheism (one God); others affirm polytheism (many Gods); still others affirm pantheism (all is God). And this is just the beginning of the contradictory statements made about God. According to the most basic laws of logic (e.g., the law of non-contradiction), these different views about God cannot be ultimately true at the same time and in the same respect. Logically, the three worldviews could all be wrong, but they could not all be correct. Again, if we are, persuaded that our religion is true, then we are faced with this uncomfortable state of exclusivity. But could there be another alternative? Does Hick's hypothesis offer an adequate solution to the problem of the conflicting truth claims of various religions? I believe that it does not. Earlier I claimed that in order for Hick's hypothesis to be plausible it must be free from internal contradictions and accurately describe religious phenomena. As I have shown, it cannot sufficiently satisfy either of these criteria.

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[1]  Wikipedia, “Theology of Religion,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theology_of_religions (accessed on 27/01/2016).

[2] Diana L. Eck., "The challenge of pluralism," The Pluralism Project, Harvard University, at: http://www.pluralism.org/ (accessed on 09/05/2016).

[3] M. Basye Holland-Shuey, "Religious Pluralism and Interfaith Dialogue," http://www.uushoals.com/ (accessed on 09/05/2016).

[4] Michael Ing, "Toward a Confucian Pluralism: Globalization in Dialogue," Confucian Studies, at: http://smedia.vermotion.com/ (accessed on 09/05/2016).

[5] The Apologetics Index discusses religious pluralism at: http://www.gospelcom.net/ (09/05/2016).

[6] "Interview with Dr. John Stott," 1998 at: http://www.gospelcom.net/ (accessed on 09/05/2016).

[7] Wikipedia, “Theology of religions” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theology_of_religions (accessed on 10/05/2016).

[8] Bernard James Mauser, Religious Pluralism: John Hick and the Elephant With Every Other Name (San Diego: Public Interest Institute, 2014), 2.

[9] John Hick, “Religious Pluralism,” in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, Edited by Michael Peterson and others (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 565.

[10] Hick, “Religious Pluralism,” in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, 566.

[11] Hick, “Religious Pluralism,” in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, 569-570.

[12] Hick, “Religious Pluralism,” in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, 570.

[13] Domenic Marbaniang, Hermeneutics of Religion ([n. p.]: Lulu.com, 2013), 9.

[14] Marbaniang, Hermeneutics of Religion, 9-11.

[15] Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 1.

[16] Alister McGrath, "Religious Pluralism," http://www.bethinking.org/truth/religious­pluralism (accessed on 09/05/2016)

[17] C. Stephen Evans, Philosophy of Religion: Thinking About Faith (USA: Inter Varity Press,1982),211.

[18] Michael Green, Evangelism and the Local Church (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990),  61.

[19] D. G. Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit (London: SCM Press, 1975), 11, 92.

[20] Dunn, Jesus, 26­33.

[21] Seyoon Kim, The Son of Man as theSon of God (Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1985), 88­ 89.

[22] William Lane Craig, "No Other Name: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation Through Christ," http://www.reasonablefaith.org/no­other­name­a­middle­knowledge­perspective (accessed on 05/05/2016).